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Insurance Bad Faith Law: The Need
for Legislative Intervention
GLENN L. ALLEN*
In 1958, the California Supreme Court first recognized a tort of in-
surance bad faith.' Since then, the scope and use of this tort has ex-
panded dramatically, markedly increasing the vulnerability of insurers
to large verdicts. In many situations, insurers are now faced with what
approaches strict liability. Ambiguous standards of conduct serve as an
open invitation to litigation. This article will review how insurance bad
faith law has developed in California, note some of the problems that
have been created, and conclude by proposing interim legislation
designed to help correct some of the inequities which have developed.
BACKGROUND
Prior to Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court,2 bad faith cases
could be divided into two basic common law types: "third party bad
faith" and "first party bad faith." This nomenclature can be a source of
confusion. Before Royal Globe, the third party bad faith action oc-
curred when an insured was sued by a third party, the insurer failed to
settle within the policy limits after being given an opportunity to do so,
the third party obtained an award in excess of the limits, and the in-
sured then sued the insurer for the "bad faith" failure to settle within
the policy limits. Although the term "third party bad faith" was used
* A.B., University of California at Berkeley. J.D., Harvard Law School.
1. Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
2. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
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in this situation because the original claim was by a third party, the
third party claimant had no right to sue the insurer for its alleged bad
faith failure to settle. Frequently, however, the insured assigned his
right to sue to the third party, although the right to sue for emotional
distress and punitive damages could not be assigned. The third party
action arose in the context of a liability insurance policy. The first
party action was brought by the insured against the insurer because of
the insurer's alleged failure to reasonably handle or pay claims submit-
ted by the insured. These actions usually arose in health, disability,
life, theft, fire or title insurance policies.
In 1979, the court in Royal Globe held that in third party cases the
claimants, who are not parties to the insurance contract, can neverthe-
less sue the insurer directly for the insurer's commission of certain un-
fair claims settlement practices prohibited by Section 790.03(h) of the
California Insurance Code.3 Although Royal Globe did not involve an
action by an insured, it can be assumed the decision provides insureds
with the right to sue their insurers for alleged violations of Section
790.03(h) in both first and third party situations.
IMPORTANT DECISIONS IN DEVELOPMENT OF BAD FAITH LAW
. The Beginning: Third Party Bad Faith
The first type of insurance bad faith action recognized by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court was the third party action. This occurred in
1958 in the case of Comunale v. Traders & GeneralInsurance Co.4 It is
not surprising the bad faith cause of action originated with a third
party case in view of the significant differences between the first and
third party cases. In the third party situation, the liability insurer nor-
mally has control over both the litigation and settlement. The insurer
has an obvious duty to the insured in this context and the need for the
protection of the rights of the insured was recognized. In Comunale,
the insurer refused to accept a reasonable settlement offer within the
insured's policy limits and an excess verdict resulted.' The insured as-
signed his rights against the insurer to the third party claimant who had
3. Id. at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845. It has been argued the court's state-
ments rearding private causes of actio n Section 790.03(h) were unnecessary to the decision and
were, strictly speaking, dictum. See Catapano-Friedman, Ciil abIlity Under the Calfiornla Prac-
tlceerAct h the After ah ofRoyal Globe, 21 FoR THE DEFENSE 61(1980). Because of the general
acceptance of Royal Globe as holding that Section 790 creates private causes of action, however,
this article will assume Royal Globe so held. Catapano-Friedman also argues persuasively the
interpretation of Section 790 by the court was incorrect and that this interpretation raises serious
constitutional questions. Unfortunately, these arguments have not yet received the attention
which they deserve.
4. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
5. Id. at 657, 328 P.2d at 200.
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obtained the excess verdict.6 The claimant then sued the insurer for the
amount in excess of the policy limits and won.7 The Comunale court
held that in every insurance contract there is an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing that prohibits either party from doing any-
thing which will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of
the agreement.8 The implied covenant requires the insurer to settle
cases where appropriate although the express terms of the policy do not
impose such a duty.9 In deciding whether to settle a claim, the insurer
must give the interests of its insured at least as much consideration as it
gives its own interests. 10 The court held a breach of the implied cove-
nant sounded both in contract and in tort," but focused most of its
attention on the contract aspect of the action.' 2 The court concluded
the measure of damages for breach of contract was the amount that
would place the plaintiff in the same position as if the contract had
been performed, which, necessarily, would be an amount in excess of
the policy limits.13 More importantly for the law of insurance bad
faith, the recognition of the tortious aspect of the action was of great
potential signficance because it provided insureds with a means of ob-
taining tort damages.
The scope of damages available from this new tort cause of action
became clear in 1967 in Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. 14 A third party
bad faith judgment was won by Mrs. Crisci, the insured, which in-
cluded an award of $25,000 for her mental suffering. 15 The insurer had
rejected a $9,000 settlement offer by the third party claimants at a time
when Mrs. Crisci had offered to pay $2,500 of the settlement.' 6 Her
policy had a $10,000 limit and the subsequent verdict against her was
for $101,000.17 The court noted that after arranging a settlement with
the plaintiffs,
6. Id. at 658, 328 P.2d at 200.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 659, 328 P.2d at 201.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 663, 328 P.2d at 203.
12. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 432 n.3, 426 P.2d 173, 178 n.3, 58 Cal.
Rptr. at 13, 18 n.3 (1967) regarding the possible reason for this:
Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Company (citation omitted) was mainly con-
cerned with the contract aspect of the action. This may be due to the fact that the tort
duty is ordinarily based on the insurer's assumption of the defense and of settlement
negotiations (citations omitted) and that in Comunale the insurer did not undertake de-
fense or settlement but denied coverage. In any event Comunale expressly recognizes
that wrongful refusal to settle has generally been treated as a tort.
13. 50 Cal. 2d at 661, 328 P.2d at 202.
14. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
15. Id. at 427, 426 P.2d at 175, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
16. Id. at 428, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
17. Id.
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Mrs. Crisci, an immigrant widow of 70, became indigent. She
worked as a babysitter, and her grandchildren paid her rent. The
change in her financial condition was accompanied by a decline in
physical health, hysteria, and suicide attempts.18
The court stated the general rule of damages in tort is that the injured
party may recover for all detriment incurred whether it could have
been anticipated or not. 9 This includes the right to recover for mental
suffering when it constitutes an aggravation of damages.20 The court
believed that although the case did not include a claim for physical
injuries, the property damage apart from the mental distress was sub-
stantial, thereby reducing the risk of a fictitious claim. Even though the
decision was somewhat ambiguous, this was the apparent justification
for permitting recovery for mental distress. 21 The court matter-of-
factly concluded Mrs. Crisci could recover for mental distress resulting
only from the interference with a property right and that this was con-
sistent with prior decisions. Nevertheless, this award for mental dis-
tress in the absence of an invasion of one's physical integrity was
actually a landmark decision.
22
B. The Emergence of First Party Bad Faith
After establishing tort remedies including emotional distress for the
insured in the third party situation, the California Supreme Court, in
the 1973 case of Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.,23 held that a bad
faith cause of action existed in first party cases despite the inherent
differences between third and first party situations.24 In the first party
18. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
19. Id. at 433, 426 P.2d at 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 433-34, 426 P.2d at 178-79, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18-19. The court noted one reason the
plaintiff had purchased the insurance policy was to protect herself against the mental distress of an
accidental loss, and that recovery of damages for mental suffering has been permitted for breach
of contracts which directly concern the comfort, happiness or personal esteem of one of the parties
(citations omitted). Id.
22. See Note, Molen v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: Negligence Actions for Emotional Dis-
tress andLoss of Consortium without Physical Injury, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1142, 1151-53 (1968). In
discussing the traditional limitation on recovery of damages for mental distress to situations in-
volving actual or imminent physical harm and the gradual movement of courts toward compensa-
tion for mental distress resulting from the invasion of protected interests other than physical
integrity, the note stated at footnote 54:
The California Supreme Court broke new ground in this area by allowing a plaintiff to
claim emotional distress when her insurance company failed to settle within her liability
policy limits, so that her health and finances were ruined (citations omitted). Her other
claims against the insurer for breach of covenants to insure and defend and for breach of
covenant of good faith and fair dealing were considered adequate guarantees of the gen-
uineness of the claim for emotional distress, especially considering the sensitive nature of
an insurance contract, which is designed to protect the insured from crushing personal
losses (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
23. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
24. Id. at 575, 510 P.2d at 1037-38, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485-86; see Spencer v. Aetna Life & Cas.
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situation, the insurer is not working to defend or settle a claim against
the insured. Instead, the insured is in an adversary relationship with
the insurer who has denied to pay his claim. The insured can normally
sue the insurer for breach of contract as soon as the claim is denied.
Furthermore, the number of potential first party situations is monu-
mental compared to the few third party situations where an excess ver-
dict has occurred. Finally, the potential injury in the denial of most
first party claims is small compared to the commonly serious losses to
an insured when a third party obtains an excess verdict against the in-
sured. In the relatively few first party situations where actual damages
are large, even if the implied covenant tort were not available, the in-
sured, according to Comunale, could sue for breach of contract and
obtain damages in excess of the contractually obligated amount that
would be necessary to place him in the same position as if the contract
had been performed.15 In addition, the insured could also sue for
fraud,26 intentional infliction of emotional distress,2 or intentional in-
terference with a property right2" where such actions are applicable.
Unfortunately, a few first party cases in which the facts were quite
appealing from a plaintiffs standpoint created a comfortable atmos-
phere for the supreme court to apply third party law to the first party
situation. The court of appeal cases of Wetherbee v. United Insurance
Co. ofAmerica29 and Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co.3
are two examples of such cases. Both cases involved the wrongful de-
nial of disability benefits. In Wetherbee, the jury awarded actual dam-
ages of $1,050 and punitive damages of $500,000. 31 Although the
appellate court held that the insured was entitled to punitive damages
for the insurer's fraudulent misrepresentation,32 it reversed the punitive
award as excessive and remanded the case for trial on the punitive
damages issue only.33 In Fletcher the appellate court concluded that
the facts presented at the trial justified the jury's finding that the de-
fendant insurer was liable for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress,34 the only cause of action that went to the jury." The court
Ins. Co., 227 Kan. 914, 611 P.2d 149, 154, 155 (1980), refusing to recognize the tort of bad faith in
Kansas, for an excellent discussion of the distinctions between third and first party bad faith.
25. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 661, 328 P.2d 198, 202 (1958).
26. Weatherbee v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 923, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764, 770
(1968).
27. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 401-02, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 94
(1970).
28. Id.
29. 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1968).
30. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
31. 265 Cal. App. 2d at 927, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
32. Id. at 927-31, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 767-70.
33. Id. at 933-35, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 771-72.
34. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
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went further to state an implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing exists in the first party situation just as it did in the third party area,
and that the violation of this duty sounds in tort.3 6 The court also con-
cluded the defendant insurer's conduct amounted to a tortious interfer-
ence with a protected property interest of its insured.37 The jury had
awarded damages of $60,000 for emotional distress and $640,000 puni-
tive damages against the insurer .3  The trial court reduced the punitive
damages to $180,00019 and the appellate court upheld the awards of
$60,000 for emotional distress and $180,000 punitive damages. 40
Following Fletcher, the supreme court ruled in Gruenberg v. Aetna
Insurance CO.41 that a cause of action for the breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing was a valid tort cause of action in the first
party situation. Gruenberg involved the review of a judgment of dis-
missal following successful demurrer to the complaint.42 The case in-
volved a suit by an insured against his fire insurers.43 The insurers
denied liability after the plaintiff had failed to appear for an examina-
tion under oath (required by the insurance policies) while arson
charges were pending against him.' The insured's complaint alleged
the insurers had encouraged criminal charges by falsely implying the
insured had a motive to commit arson, knowing the plaintiff would not
appear for an examination during the pendency of the criminal charges
against him.41 The court held the tort of bad faith existed in the first
party situation and the plaintiff's pleadings adequately alleged bad
faith.46 The court also concluded that the plaintiff had adequately
pleaded emotional distress because he had alleged substantial damages
for loss of property apart from damages for emotional distress.47 Spe-
cifically, the plaintiff alleged loss of earnings, being compelled to go out
of business, inability to pay business creditors and the cost of resulting
litigation with them, and medical expenses. 48 The court cited Crisci's
position that when substantial damages exist apart from those due to
mental distress, the danger of fictitious claims is reduced.4 9
35. Id. at 385, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 82.
36. Id. at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 385, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 82.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 408-09, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 98-99.
41. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
42. Id. at 569, 510 P.2d at 1034, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
43. Id. at 570-72, 510 P.2d at 1034-36, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 482-84.
44. Id. at 570-71, 510 P.2d at 1035, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
45. Id. at 575, 510 P.2d at 1039, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
46. d.
47. Id. at 580, 510 P.2d at 1041-42, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 579, 510 P.2d at 1041, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
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Gruenberg was followed in 1974 by Silberg v. California Life Insur-
ance Co.,50 a California Supreme Court decision reviewing a trial of a
first party bad faith case wherein bad faith had been specifically al-
leged.51 The case involved the refusal of an insurer to pay hospital and
medical benefits to an insured pending the outcome of the insured's
workmen's compensation proceedings.52 The insured's workmen's
compensation claim was of questionable validity. 3 He apparently had
no other accident or disability insurance, 4 had serious financial and
medical problems,55 and the insurer had represented in its application
form its insurance could protect against medical bills that could ruin
him. 6 The supreme court held the insurer violated its implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing and that the jury's award of $75,000 com-
pensatory damages was not excessive. In regard to the jury's award
of $500,000 punitive damages,58 the supreme court upheld the trial
court's decision to grant a new trial on this issue because there was
insufficient evidence to justify an award of punitive damages. 9
C The Test of Liability in Third Party Cases
With the third party cases of Comunale and Crisci having cleared the
way for the first party cases of Gruenberg and Silberg, the right to sue
in tort for bad faith in both the third and first party situations was es-
tablished. However, the test(s) of liability in bad faith cases, and
whether there would be strict liability, was still unclear, as the 1975
case of Johansen v. Caifornia State Automobile Association Inter-Insur-
ance Bureau60 demonstrated.61 In Johansen, the insurer refused to set-
tle a personal injury action against its insureds after a reasonable
50. 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1971).
51. Id. at 456, 521 P.2d at 1106, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 461, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 457-59, 521 P.2d at 1106-08, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 714-16.
56. Id. at 461, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
57. Id. at 462, 521 P.2d at 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
58. Id. at 456, 521 P.2d at 1106, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
59. Id. at 463, 521 P.2d at 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
60. 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975).
61. In the third party area, Comunale provided that "when there is a great risk of a recovery
beyond the policy limits so that the most reasonable manner of disposing ofthe claim is a settle-
ment which can be made within those limits, a consideration in good failth of the insured's interest
requires the insurer to settle the claim." Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654,
659, 328 P.2d 198, 201 (1958). In Criscl, the court accepted the trial court's test of "considerable
risk of substantial recovery" beyond the policy limits. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425,
432, 426 P.2d 173, 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. 17, 18 (1967) (emphasis added). In the first party area, the
Gruenberg court held that "when the insurer unreasonably and in bad faith withholds payment of
the claim of its insured, it is subject to liability in tort." Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d
566, 575, 510 P.2d 1032, 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 486 (1973). In Silberg, the court appeared to
accept the aforementioned language of Gruenberg although the language of the holding was some-
what unclear. 11 Cal. 3d at 460-62, 521 P.2d at 1108-10, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 716-18.
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settlement demand within the policy limits.6 2 The insurer's reason for
refusing to settle was that the policy did not provide coverage.63 After
the personal injury action had been initiated and before the settlement
demand was made, the insurer had filed a declaratory relief action to
obtain a judicial determination of whether the policy afforded cover-
age.64 Despite the insurer's efforts to have the declaratory relief action
expedited, the personal injury action went to trial first and an excess
verdict was returned against the insureds.65 In the subsequent trial of
the declaratory relief action, the trial court ruled for the insurer on the
coverage question but this determination was reversed on appeal.66 A
third party bad faith action followed.6 7 The trial court rendered a
judgment for the insurer, finding it had denied coverage in good faith.6 s
In reversing the trial court, the supreme court stated:
an insurer's "good faith," though erroneous, belief in noncoverage
affords no defense to liability flowing from the insurer's refusal to
accept a reasonable settlement offer.
[i]n deciding whether or not to compromise the claim, the insurer
must conduct itself as though it alone were liable for the entire
amount of the judgment (citations omitted). Thus, the only permissi-
ble consideration in evaluating the reasonableness of the settlement
offer becomes whether, in light of the victim's injuries and the proba-
ble liability of the insured, the ultimate judgment is likely to exceed
the amount of the settlement offer. Such factors as the limits im-
posed by the policy, a desire to reduce the amount of future settle-
ments, or a belief that the policy does not provide coverage, should
not affect a decision as to whether the settlement offer in question is a
reasonable one.69
In reaching its decision that the rejected settlement offer was a rea-
sonable one,70 the Johansen court adopted dictum from Crisei to the
effect that hindsight was appropriate in determining the reasonableness
of the settlement offer:
The size of the judgment recovered in the personal injury action
when it exceeds the policy limits, although not conclusive, furnished
an inference that the value of the claim is the equivalent of the
amount of the judgment and that acceptance of an offer within those
62. 15 Cal. 3d at 13, 16, 17, 538 P.2d at 746, 748, 749, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 290, 292, 293.
63. Id. at 13, 538 P.2d at 746, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 13, 14, 538 P.2d at 746, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
67. Id. at 14, 538 P.2d at 747, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 16, 538 P.2d at 748, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
70. Id. at 16-17, 538 P.2d at 748-49, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93.
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limits was the most reasonable method of dealing with the claim (ci-
tations omitted).7 1
Although purportedly using a test of reasonableness, the language of
Johansen left the insurer subject to a standard which approaches strict
liability in the third party bad faith situation.72
D. Neal
In 1978, the supreme court, in the first party case of Neal v. Farmers
Insurance Exchange,73 referred to the test of reasonableness set forth in
Gruenberg in approving a jury finding of bad faith by the insurer. As
in Silberg, the test of liability upon which the supreme court based its
decision was unclear.74 No mention was made of the Johansen case.
The facts of the case involved an insurer that refused to pay the maxi-
mum benefits available ($15,000) under an uninsured motorist provi-
sion.75 Apparently there was a legitimate question of whether the
uninsured motorist was negligent and the insured's husband was cited
for making an illegal left turn in the path of the uninsured motorist's
oncoming vehicle.76 The insurer was willing to settle the claim prior to
arbitration for $5,000, claiming that $5,000 in medical benefits already
paid under a medical payments provision ($5,000 limit) of the same
automobile insurance policy should be an offset against any amounts
due under the uninsured motorist provision.77 The insurer's attorney
had advised the insurer the law was unclear on the question of the off-
set, the negligence of the husband could not be imputed to the insured,
and that "at best" the case was "50-50" on liability.78 The $5,000 offer
was rejected and an arbitrator subsequently awarded the full $15,000.
71
A first party bad faith action followed. At trial, the jury awarded ap-
proximately $1,500,000 punitive damages, compensatory damages be-
71. Id. at 17, 538 P.2d at 749, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
72. See Comment, Johansen v. Califomia State Automobile Association: Has California
Adopted Strict Liability for an Izsurer'r Failure to Settle?, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 895, 896 (1976):
In the recent case of Johansen v. California State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance
Bureau, the court answered plaintiff's arguments which urged the adoption of strict lia-
bility by saying that it was not necessary to resolve the issue. This note, however, will
argue that Johansen and other decisions since Crisci have in fact resolved the issue in
favor of an unannounced policy of strict liability for failure to settle within the policy
limits. Although this result may in some respects be consistent with good public policy
and, most important, may minimize the conflict of interest problems described above, it
also raises a variety of practical problems, perhaps the most important of which is the
possibility that this new leverage could be abused by a plaintiff acting in bad faith.
73. 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978).
74. Id. at 920-22, 582 P.2d at 985-86, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 394-95.
75. Id. at 917-20, 582 P.2d at 983-85, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 392-94.
76. Id. at 934, 582 P.2d at 994, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 403 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 918-19, 582 P.2d at 983-84, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 392-93.
78. Id. at 919, 582 P.2d at 984, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
79. Id. at 919-20, 582 P.2d at 984, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
Paefct Law Journal / Vol 13
ing $9,573.65.8o The trial court reduced the punitive award to
approximately $750,000,' which was upheld by the supreme court.82
Although the supreme court did not state specifically how stringently
the reasonableness test would be applied to insurers, Justice Clark, dis-
senting, gave his own opinion:
The majority's holding, that a first party insurer may not "guess
wrong," effectively abolishes the present statutory scheme for han-
dling uninsured motorist claims. We may anticipate arbitration, pur-
suant to Insurance Code Section 11580.2, will no longer be used to
resolve these disputes because the penalty for losing in arbitration
will be an automatic second proceeding in superior court for "bad
faith" breach of the insurance policy. Thus, all claims must necessar-
ily be paid regardless of how frivolous. And who is it that will ulti-
mately bear the burden? Obviously, it is the general motoring public
through massive increases in premium. Today, 25 percent of the
public cannot afford car insurance. Tomorrow, under the majority's
strict liability holding, the percentage must increase, thus creating
more uninsured motorists, consequently more uninsured motorist
claims. When this cycle has run its course even fewer motorists will
exist who can afford insurance. 3
E Egan
Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange was followed in 1979 by Egan v.
Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., involving a directed verdict against
the insurer for first party bad faith in failing to properly investigate the
insured's disability claim." The supreme court upheld the directed
verdict, reiterating the reasonableness test of Gruenberg without any
significant elaboration. 6 The jury found the insurer liable for $45,600
in general damages, $78,000 for emotional distress, and $5,000,000 in
punitive damages.87 The jury was allowed to include future policy ben-
efits within the compensatory damage award. 8 The supreme court up-
held the compensatory award, specifically approving the jury's right to
include future contract benefits in the compensatory award.8 9 The
supreme court reversed the punitive award, concluding it was the result
of passion and prejudice by the jurors and was excessive as a matter of
80. Id. at 920, 582 P.2d at 985, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 929, 582 P.2d at 991, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
83. Id. at 942, 582 P.2d at 999-1000, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 408-09.
84. 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1978).
85. Id. at 817, 598 P.2d at 455, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
86. Id. at 818-19, 598 P.2d at 456, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
87. Id. at 817, 598 P.2d at 455, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
88. Id. at 824 n.7, 598 P.2d at 460 n.7, 157Cal. Rptr. at 490 n.7.
89. Id.
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law. 90
F Royal Globe
Insurers were staggered in 1979 by the Royal Globe9 decision. The
4-3 majority ignored the intent of Section 790.03(h) of the California
Insurance Code92 and held certain acts prohibited in that section, spe-
cifically the acts set forth in Section 790.03(h)(5) and (h)(14),93 could be
the basis for private actions by third party claimants.
94
The knowing commission of one of the proscribed acts in a single
instance or the performance of one of the acts with such frequency as to
indicate a general business practice was sufficient to permit an action.
95
Royal Globe is completely unilateral in the dispensation of benefits to
claimants because no corresponding obligations are imposed upon the
third-party adversary to act in good faith in dealing with the insurer.
Although the facts of Royal Globe were such that the decision dealt
specifically with only two of the fifteen proscribed Section 790.03(h)
practices, the language of the opinion appears to permit claims based
on other subsections of 790.03(h) as well as subsections of 790.03 other
than 790.03(h). Further, despite the fact Royal Globe concerned a
plaintiff who was a third party claimant, actions by insureds for Section
790.03(h) violations in both first and third party situations will presum-
ably now be permitted.
PRESENT STATUS OF INSURANCE BAD FAITH LAW IN CALIFoRNIA
A. Third Party Common Law Bad Faith
In the third party situation, insureds can sue under the common law
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing if the
insurer's failure to settle results in an excess verdict. Strict liability
90. Id.
91. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
92. See generally Comment, Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court: Right to Direct Suit
Agaitnt an Insurer by a Third Party Claimant, 31 HASTINoS LJ. 1161 (1980).
93. CAL. INS. CODE §790.03: Prohibited Acts
The following are hereby defined as unfair methods of competition and unfair decep-
tive acts or practices in the business of insurance.
(h) Knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a gen-
eral business practice any of the following unfair claims settlement practices:
(5) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements
of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.
(14) Directly advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney.
94. 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
95. Id. at 890, 891, 592 P.2d at 336, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
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probably exists in this area in view of the language of Johansen v. Cali-
fornia State Automobile Association.
B. First Party Common Law Bad Faith
In the first party area, insureds can sue under the common law for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in han-
dling and settling claims. As will be explained more fully below, some-
thing approaching strict liability exists as a practical matter in many
first party bad faith cases as a result of the practical problems created
by the supposed test of reasonableness referred to in Gruenberg, Si/berg,
Neal and Egan.
C. Royal Globe Bad Faith
Royal Globe has left numerous questions unanswered regarding the
magnitude and variety of future Royal Globe actions. Questions exist
as to the test of liability, standing to sue, the extent of recoverable dam-
ages, the extent to which Royal Globe applies to the various subsections
of 790.03, and other issues. 6 Because of the many uncertainties, only a
few observations about the potential scope of Royal Globe will be made
here. In the third party cases, third party claimants now are able to sue
directly rather than only as the assignee of the insured's rights. This
allows the third party claimant to recover damages for emotional dis-
tress and punitive damages which were not available to an assignee.
Numerous actions will presumably be brought not only where there are
excess verdicts, but also where there are plaintiffs verdicts within the
policy limits that are as great or greater than rejected settlement de-
mands by the third party claimant.
In first party actions under Royal Globe (assuming Royal Globe will
apply in this area), insureds have been given additional means of estab-
lishing insurer liability as a result of the laundry list of proscribed prac-
tices in Section 790.03(h). Royal Globe causes of action are already
commonly being pleaded alongside causes of action for violation of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in lawsuits resulting
from the denial of contract benefits. For the most part, first party Royal
Globe causes of action will just add another dimension to the problems
already existing for insurers as a result of first party implied covenant
law.
96. For an excellent discussion of many of the questions raised by Royal Globe, see generally
Kornblum, Royal Globe v. Superior Court: Its Impact on Litigation Involving Insurers, 15 FORUM
967 (1980).
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PROBLEMS WITH PRESENT LAW
In terms of unfairness to insurers, the problems in bad faith law at
present are primarily in two areas: (1) first party implied covenant
cases; and (2) first and third party Royal Globe actions.
As for third party implied covenant law, it is certainly something an
insurer should be wary of because excess verdicts after insurers refuse
to settle within the policy limits will, in most cases, be the full responsi-
bility of the carrier or carriers (primary and possible excess carriers).
However, the number of potential third party implied covenant cases is
very small compared with the number of potential first party implied
covenant cases. Insurers have at least become aware of the dangers of
failing to settle and can prevent the third party implied covenant action
by settling before trial.
A. Insurer Problems in the First Party Area
The first party implied covenant situation creates serious and inequi-
table problems for insurers. Particularly in areas such as health insur-
ance, massive numbers of claims are processed on a daily basis.
Because of the massive volume, relatively large numbers of seemingly
unjustified claims should be denied by those processing them. The
courts have created, however, a situation where large penalties can eas-
ily result from the denial of these claims.
1. Contract Interpretation
The vulnerability of insurers to bad faith allegations in the process-
ing of mammoth numbers of claims by insureds exists for several rea-
sons. First, the courts have created rules of contract interpretation
which consistently favor the insured and can result in the resolution of
contract disputes with insureds in ways difficult for insurers to antici-
pate and protect against.97 In addition to the rules of interpretation
applicable to all insurance contracts, additional rules of interpretation
favorable to insureds exist where the insurance contract is defined as an
97. See Maxon v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, 214 Cal. App. 2d 603, 611, 29 Cal. Rptr.
586, 590 (1963):
We must also take cognizance of certain well-established rules of construction applicable
to insurance contracts, to wit: that any ambiguity or uncertainty in an insurance policy is
to be resolved against the insurer, if semantically permissible, the contract will be given
such construction as will fairly achieve its object of securing indemnity to the insured for
the losses to which the insurance relates; if the insurer uses language which is uncertain
any reasonable doubt will be resolved against it; if the doubt relates to the extent or fact
of coverage, whether as to peril insured against, the amount of liability of the person or
persons protected, the language will be understood in its most inclusive sense, for the
benefit of the insured, and, where two interpretations equally fair may be made, that
which affords the greatest measure of protection to the insured will prevail (citations
omitted).
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adhesion contract.98 Because insurance contracts in California are
commonly found to be adhesion contracts, this additional burden is
one insurers can anticipate facing if a contract dispute with an insured
occurs. Because of these rules of contract interpretation, an insurer can
also anticipate that whenever a court can find an ambiguity in the con-
tractual provision leading to the denial of benefits, the insured will
probably prevail.
2. Test of Reasonableness
Once a contract is interpreted in favor of the insured under the afore-
mentioned weighted rules of interpretation, the insured under present
bad faith law can immediately claim the losing insurer violated the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by denying a legitimate
claim. All the insured need then prove to show insurer bad faith is that
the insurer's interpretation of the contract was an unreasonable one.
Who decides whether the insurance company's mistake was unreasona-
ble? A jury. It is well known insurance companies are not favored by
the average juror,99 and the ease with which a jury can interpret the
insurance company's refusal to pay contract benefits as unreasonable is
obvious.
3. Damages for Emotional Distress
Once unreasonableness ("bad faith") is found, the whole panoply of
damage possibilities under California law is then available for the
98. See Jones v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 630, 638-39, 150 Cal. Rptr. 375, 379-80
(1978):
As noted above, the contract under consideration is a contract of adhesion. It is now
well established that when an insurance policy is deemed an adhesion contract, the 'ex-
press provisions of the insurance contract must be considered in fight of the insured's
normal expectations of the extent of the coverage of the policy, and notice of noncover-
age in a situation where coverage may be reasonably expected must be conspicuous,
plain and clear (citations omitted).' The court in Gyer also expressed this principle as
follows: 'The meaning of an insurance policy is determined by the insured's reasonable
expectation of coverage, and all doubts are resolved against the insurer. [Citation.] Any
uncertainty or ambiguity in the peril insured against will be resolved in favor of impos-
ing liability (citations omitted).'
Defendant also asserts that this instruction was improper because the instruction
stated that defendant owed a duty to notify the insured of the exclusion. Since the con-
tract in question was an adhesion contract, defendant did have a duty to notify the in-
sured of the exclusion. 'In the case of standardized insurance contracts, exceptions and
limitations on coverage that the insured could reasonably expect, must be called to his
attention, clearly and plainly, before the exclusions will be interpreted to relieve the in-
surer of liability or performance (citation omitted).'
But see generally Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr.
882 (1975) (not a contract of adhesion).
99. See Comment, Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.: The Expanding Use of Punitive Dam-
ages i Breach of Contract Actions, 15 SAN DiEoo L. REv. 287, 304, 305 (1978).
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plaintiff-insured.co Particularly where the nature of the defendant
tends to make jurors receptive to a plaintifs arguments concerning
damages, the liberal nature of California damage law is a dangerous
problem, especially in the areas of emotional distress and punitive
damages.101
As discussed above, the court in Crisci held that damages for emo-
tional distress could be claimed in a bad faith case where there was
substantial property damage apart from emotional distress.102 Subse-
quent appellate decisions10 3 have permitted much more modest eco-
nomic losses than those recited in Crisci or Gruenberg to support an
award for emotional distress. At present, the cost of employing an at-
torney to represent the insured in the initial claim dispute is apparently
the only economic loss necessary to substantiate a claim for emotional
distress.10e In effect, then, emotional distress can be claimed in almost
any first party bad faith action.
In the recent case of Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals05 the
court found negligent infliction of emotional distress actionable with-
out extreme and outrageous conduct, physical impact or injury, or any
financial loss apart from the emotional distress. In light of the diluted
requirement of economic loss in recent bad faith cases and the philoso-
phy expounded in Molien, the requirement of any economic loss at all
may soon disappear if it has not already.106
100. See LEVINE, DAMAGES ALERT (1981). The book begins with a five-page checklist of the
myriad forms of damages that plaintiffs can now sue for. At the end of the checklist it is stated:
The checklist should also be utilized in drafting any settlement demand letter to the
defendant's insurance carrier. It is now clear that an insurer must attempt in good faith
to effectuate a 'prompt, fair and equitable settlement of claims in which liability has
become reasonably clear.' [Insurance Code Section 790.03(h)(5)] If it fails to do so, the
insurance company itself may be liable for damages to the claimant. Royal Globe Ins.
Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 23 C.3d 880, 153 C.R. 842.
101. See Korublum, The Defense of the First Party Extra-Contract Case: Strategy in Negotia-
tions and Discovery, 12 FORUM 721 (1977):
From the first Wetherbee v. United Insurance Company decision in 1968 through 1975,
there were 36 first-party, extra-contract cases tried to verdict in California. Of this
number, 31, or 86 percent, resulted in a verdict of extra-contract compensatory or puni-
tive damages. In 25, or 69 percent of the cases, the jury awarded punitive damages
ranging from $550 to $8,000,000. More significantly, among these 36 cases, there were
only three defense verdicts (i.e., where the jury found the insurer owed no contract bene-
fits) and only two cases where the jury awarded contract benefits only (i.e., no extra-
contract compensatory or punitive damages were awarded).
102. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433-34, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19
(1967).
103. See, eg., Delos v. Farmers Ins. Group, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 3d 642, 15 Cal. Rptr. 843
(1979); Pistorius v. Prudential Ins. Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 541, 176 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1981).
104. 123 Cal. App. at 550, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
105. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
106. See Note, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: Negligence Actions for Emotional Dis-
tress and Loss of Consortium without Physical Injury, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1142, 1153 n.52 (1981).
After citing the Crisc; Silberg and Gruenberg cases, the footnote states:
Since these supreme court cases dealt only with insurers, a question remained whether
the court would allow mental distress claims accompanying other tort or contract claims
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Emotional distress damages are particularly problematic to an un-
popular defendant because their definition is necessarily unclear and
the guidelines for a jury are vague. In this context large and unwar-
ranted awards for emotional distress can result. When punitive dam-
ages are also an issue the large emotional distress award is even more
damaging because it can help to justify an even larger punitive award
because the ratio between compensatory and punitive damages is one





Punitive damages, just as with emotional damages, can easily be the
subject of abuse by jurors prejudiced against insurance companies.108
The problems confronting insurers in regard to punitive damages can
be illustrated by examining the guidelines used in determining the ap-
propriate amount of a punitive damage award. Neal v. Farmers Insur-
ance Exchange set forth the three established factors: the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's acts, the amount of compensatory
damages, and the wealth of the defendant. w9 One can assume
whatever reprehensibility exists in the acts performed is easily magni-
fied in the eyes of a jury when performed by an insurance company.
As for the amount of compensatory damages, where damages for emo-
tional distress can be awarded, the compensatory damages can be very
substantial even though the defendant has little out-of-pocket loss. As
for the wealth of the defendant, the substantial size of most insurance
companies provides access to large punitive awards.
The recent court of appeal decision in Pistorius v. Prudential Insur-
ance Co. I is an example of the problem insurers are faced with in the
with a likelihood of serious emotional consequences. Also, the insurance cases dealt
with parties in contractual relationships to one another. They might be explained as
extending the contract notion of contemplated special damages. See Hadley v. Bax-
endale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). But Molen allows claims for foreseeable emotional
injury even when the claim is not tied to an invasion of another protected interest of the
plaintiff. It clearly adopts a tort theory of broad liability for harm to a separate protected
interest in freedom from serious mental disturbance.
107. Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal 3d 910, 928, 582 P.2d 980, 990, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 399
(1978).
108. See Kornblum, The Defense of the First Party Extra-Contract Case: Strategy in Negotia-
tions and Discovery, 12 FORUM 721, 723 (1977).
Within the last eight years, juries have awarded punitive damages of $1.5 million, $2.5
million, $4 million, $5 million, $5.3 million and $8 million against insurers. Despite the
publicity surrounding these punitive verdicts, the highest verdict to survive trial and ap-
pellate court review in California is the $200,000 punitive damages awarded in the sec-
ond appellate decision in Wetherbee v. United Insurance Company (footnotes omitted).
109. 21 Cal. 3d at 928, 582 P.2d at 990, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
110. 123 Cal. App. 3d 541, 176 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1981).
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area of damages. Disability payments were withheld over five months
during a dispute between the insurer and insured, during which time
the insured had another source of income and was able to purchase an
automobile.' In examining the compensatory award of $45,000, the
appellate court assumed a breakdown of $450 for attorneys' fees, pres-
ent cash value of future policy benefits of $17,200, and $27,350 for
emotional distress. 112 The court did not view the emotional distress
award as being so grossly disproportionate as to raise a presumption of
passion and prejudice requiring action by the reviewing court." 3 Hav-
ing found the compensatory award was proper, the court held that the
jury award of $1,000,000 punitive damages was not excessive as a mat-
ter of law in view of the size of the compensatory award, the wealth of
the defendant, and the defendant's conduct."
14
b. Acts of Employees
The ongoing liberalization of the law of punitive damages is creating
even greater problems for insurers in bad faith cases. In Egan, the
court held the insurer could be liable in punitive damages for the ac-
tions of a claims adjuster because he could dispose of an insured's
claim with little or no supervision.I" The critical inquiry in determin-
ing whether an employee acted in a managerial capacity depended
upon the degree of discretion the employee possessed "in making deci-
sions that will ultimately determine corporate policy.""16 The court ap-
parently considered an employee's decision regarding a single claim to
be within this definition. With an unprecedented' definition of man-
agerial capacity of this breadth, large numbers of corporate employees
will obviously be able to perform acts which can be attributed to the
insurer and possibly result in the award of punitive damages.
Given the nature of the insurance business, insurers must permit
their lower echelon employees to exercise a great deal of discretion.
This necessity arises because of the volume of claims processed by the
insurers. Specifically, much of this discretion is exercised by adjusters
as they attempt to settle claims. Egan appears to state the unauthorized
and unratified discretionary act of an adjuster makes company policy
and is therefore managerial in nature. This is a novel view of how an
111. Id. at 552, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
112. Id. at 550, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
113. Id. at 552, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
114. Id. at 553-55, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 667-69. See also Chodos v. Insurance Co. of N. Amer.,
126 Cal. App. 3d 81, - Cal. Rptr. - (1981).
115. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 823, 598 P.2d 452, 459, 157 Cal. Rptr.
482, 489 (1979).
116. Id. at 822-23, 598 P.2d at 458-59, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 488-89.
117. Id. at 832-34, 598 P.2d at 465-66, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 495-96 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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insurer's corporate policy is made and such "logic" places almost any-
one performing a discretionary act for an insurer in a managerial role.
c. Nature of Act
The danger to the insurer resulting from the Egan definition of man-
agerial capacity is heightened by the increasingly liberal definition of
acts sufficient to permit an award of punitive damages. Increasingly,
acts of negligence are seen as sufficient grounds."' Egan provides an
excellent example. In that case, punitive damages were assessed
against the insurer following a finding by the trial court that as a matter
of law the insurer had violated the covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing where a disability claim was denied without having the insured ex-
amined by one of its own physicians or by consulting the insured's
treating physicians and surgeon.119 The adjusters had mistakenly re-
lied on the physicians' written reports alone instead of making an effort
to discuss the case with them. 120
As in the case of the liberalization of the requirements for obtaining
damages for emotional distress, the liberalization in regard to punitive
damages will likewise increase the impact of bad faith law on insurers.
B. Insurer Problems With Royal Globe
In first party cases, the addition of a Royal Globe cause of action
broadens the insurer's existing liability and increases the insurer's ex-
posure for denying claims. A basic problem insurers will have in de-
fending against Royal Globe causes of action is the broad language
used in Section 790.03. It is completely understandable that the section
was broadly written in view of the fact that the real purpose of the act
was to allow the Insurance Commissioner to prevent unfair practices
by insurers. It was designed so the Commissioner would have the max-
imum amount of flexibility in implementing Section 790 for the pro-
spective benefit of the public. To take this broad language and allow
private parties to use it in private actions against insurers exposes them
to unfair results. When the language is as all-encompassing as it is in
Section 790, the jury passing judgment on a disfavored defendant is
given an unparalleled opportunity to find liability. Once this is done,
the tort damages already discussed become available.
118. See, ag., Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 594 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693
(1979); Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, Inc., 95 Cal. App. 3d 279, 157 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1979).
See also a discussion of punitive damages cases not requiring intent in Note, Taylor v. Superior
Court: Funitive Damagesfor Nondeliberate Torts-The Drunk Driving Context, 68 CALIF. L. REv.
911 (1980).
119. 24 Cal. 3d at 817, 598 P.2d at 455, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
120. Id. at 832, 598 P.2d at 465, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 495 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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In third party Royal Globe cases, problems of overbreadth of lan-
guage in Section 790 and of tort damages also apply. In addition, Royal
Globe established what approaches a fiduciary obligation upon the in-
surer toward its adversary, the third party claimant, in claims settle-
ment practices. An example of the benefit to third party claimants can
easily be seen by looking at the opportunities provided to the third
party claimant by Section 790.03(h)(5), which requires the insurer at-
tempt "in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settle-
ments of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear." The
insurer has now been left in a situation where any time it does not settle
a case and a subsequent jury award is the same as the amount of the
third party claimant's settlement demand or greater, the insurer is vul-
nerable to a Royal Globe action for bad faith for failing to settle. The
obvious impact on liability carriers is to encourage them to pay more in
settlement because such settlements not only end the present lawsuit
but may prevent a Royal Globe action in the future. The increased
settlement costs required to settle the actual lawsuit and the potential
one that hovers over most litigation involving an insured defendant
will obviously result in higher premiums. In addition, those insurers
that have the courage to refuse settlement where they do not feel it is
warranted will necessarily be the subject of additional litigation be-
cause they will not in all instances have guessed correctly regarding the
value of the case. When they have guessed incorrectly, Royal Globe
encourages lawsuits against them.
An additional problem created by Royal Globe in the third party
area is the inevitable conflicts of interest created by the insurer's obliga-
tions to its insured and its Royal Globe obligations to the insured's ad-
versary, the third party claimant. This third party situation is different
from the common law third party bad faith situation because in the
latter the insurer was requested by the insured to pay the third party
adversary. In the Royal Globe situation, the insured need not be de-
manding settlement, but may to the contrary want his case vigorously
defended by the insurer or at least settled for the least amount possible.
In both first and third party Royal Globe cases, the potential for mas-
sive, invasive discovery into insurer files exists because one way to es-
tablish liability is to prove that an insurer has performed a section
790.03(h) proscribed act as a general business practice. 121 The costs of
such discovery in time and money and the potential for abuse is readily
apparent.
121. See generally Levy & Ursin, Tort Law in Californhia At the Crossroads, 67 CALF. L. REv.
496 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Levy & Ursin].
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF BAD FAITH LAW-WAS IT AN ATTEMPT TO
REDUCE TORT SYSTEM COSTS?
The legislative remedy suggested later in this article is proposed as
an attempt to cut the cost of insurance as well as the cost of administer-
ing the tort system. In a 1979 article in the California Law Review, the
theory was put forth that the supreme court had this latter goal in mind
in its creation of insurance bad faith law.'22 The article noted that in a
wide variety of decisions in the 1960's and 1970's the supreme court
had significantly expanded the incidence of tort liability in California
and through 1976 had developed a damages doctrine which permits
large awards."2 The article theorized that beginning in 1977 the court
has attempted in certain decisions to limit tort system costs by decreas-
ing the size of awards and cutting the cost of administering the tort
system. 24 One "device" used by the court to encourage settlement and
thereby reduce tort system administrative costs, according to the article,
is the "bad faith" award against insurers.
25
The article classified bad faith law within a broader category de-
scribed as "implicit damages" cases, mainly cases decreasing damage
awards and therefore tort system costs.' 26 The article concluded the
"implicit damages" approach was one that muddies tort doctrine, con-
fusing lawyers and other observers of the court, and is too inexact a
method to assure proper results in varying patterns.1 27 These criticisms
can certainly be applied to California insurance bad faith law.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF BAD FAITH LAW-ACTUALLY AN EXAMPLE
OF A BROADER PROBLEM OF UNCONTROLLED EXPANSION
OF THE TORT SYSTEM AND ITS COSTS
The problems growing out of the development of insurance bad faith
law represent a danger inherent in creating a new form of tort liability
122. Ldvy & Ursin, sufpra note 113, at 518-19.
123. Levy & Ursin, supra note 113, at 521.
124. Levy & Ursin, supra note 113, at 535-36.
125. Levy & Ursin, supra note 113, at 521.
126. Levy & Ursin, supra note 113, at 539-40.
127. See remarks of Guy 0. Korablum in this regard in Davis, Joint Program of the Defense
Research Committee and the Defense Research Institute, XLVIII Insurance Counsel Journal 556,
559 (1981):
I can't tell you the number of Royal Globe cases that are being filed. Almost every case
involving a claim either with first or third party coverage now includes a Royal Globe
statutory claim, setting forth the precise provisions. The attempt to get into the insurer's
files, the discovery that is conducted, is absolutely massive because the statute requires
either a knowing violation or a continuous practice. And under the continuous practice
portion of 790.03(h), discovery can be conducted into other lawsuits, other claims, the
types of claims that are being handled in the state, how claims are being handled nation-
wide, so that it's virtually unlimited as far as the potential discovery with the limitation
only being what time plaintiff has to put into his lawsuit.
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today, particularly because the various types of tort damages are so
broad and generous. Once a new tort is established, perhaps in a case
or cases where tort damages may be warranted in terms of pure equity
(e.g., Comunale and Crisci), the tort may eventually be applied to
countless other situations where it is often inappropriate and not in the
best interest of society (e.g., the millions of health care claims now sub-
ject to common law bad faith, Royal Globe, and the liberal and ever-
expanding damages law). The age-old adage, "bad cases make bad
law," is true now more than ever in the California tort field. In earlier
times when decisions such as Molen, for example, did not exist, the
evolution of a new tort had less impact than it now has because the
damages allowed by law were much more limited. Torts traditionally
dealt most often with situations in which the plaintiff obtained reim-
bursement mainly for "hard injuries" such as quantifiable and substan-
tial physical or economic losses. Now, in an atmosphere of relatively
easy accessibility to damages for emotional distress and punitive dam-
ages, the impact of having created a new tort and then expanding it
with Royal Globe is tremendous. In short, concomitant expansion of
both tort forms of liability and tort damages has a synergistic, geomet-
ric effect on the expansion of overall tort system costs.
Long ago, Justice Traynor indicated his concern in this area. He was
an early leader in the expansion of tort remedies to distribute accident
losses in a society in which insurance had become widespread.' 28 He
was concerned, however, about the effect that damages could have once
the incidence of liability had been significantly increased. For exam-
ple, he questioned whether damages for pain and suffering should be
allowed in a system based on the distribution of losses through
insurance. 129
Currently in bad faith law, many plaintiffs appear to be receiving
large awards not because of actual injuries but because of tests of liabil-
ity approaching strict liability and because of jury prejudice against
insurers. These verdicts, as well as the insurers' other costs of increased
litigation and the defensive payment of questionable or fraudulent
claims, result in costs that are not in fact what "loss distribution"
should be about. Present bad faith law has magnified claims denials
both legitimate and otherwise into a cost to society much greater than
any actual losses by plaintiffs.
Because actual losses by plaintiffs in bad faith cases are a relatively
small part of this societal expense, the costs of the impact of bad faith
128. Levy & Ursin, supra note 110, at 497-500.
129. Levy & Ursin, supra note 110, at 520-21.
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law might instead be termed "legal costs distribution." Attorneys, both
in the plaintiffs' and defense bar, are obviously reaping the benefits of
the massive impact of insurance bad faith litigation. Plaintiffs' counsel
are sharing in the settlements and awards of their clients in bad faith
litigation and are undoubtedly obtaining higher settlements in other
areas of their practices because of the spectre of bad faith law. The
defense bar, as in any situation where litigation increases in absolute
numbers and in the potential exposure of the defendants, profits from
the increased needs of its clients. While the evolution of bad faith law
has provided increased revenues and employment for attorneys, the so-
ciety, through increased insurance premiums and other costs, has had
to foot the bill as it has in other areas where the creation of new law has
resulted in large and burdensome societal costs resulting to a large ex-
tent from the need for legal services.
It is probably too late for the supreme court to turn back from the
course it has taken in insurance bad faith law, particularly in view of
the court's present composition, and a legislative remedy appears to be
the only immediate answer. However, because of the power of the
plaintiffs' bar as represented by the California Trial Lawyers Associa-
tion, any legislative remedy is probably impossible. 130 Nevertheless,
the following proposal is made as an initial attempt to limit the tort
costs of bad faith litigation.
INTERIM LEGISLATION
The following proposal is basically a procedural one which follows,
in many respects, the format established by the existing declaratory re-
lief statutes, California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1060, et. seq. 131
It is primarily aimed at resolving coverage questions at an early stage
in an attempt to limit the expenses of first-party litigation and, where
applicable, the damages of the insured. The proposal provides for de-
claratory relief as well as, in the discretion of the court, reasonable at-
torney's fees and other reasonable and necessary costs of litigation.
Further, where the judgment is entered against the insurer, the court
may award a penalty and all actual economic damages to the insured.
It is hoped that the discretionary award of legal fees and costs will en-
courage a party that anticipates victory to use the expedited procedure.
The insurer would presumably be in this position if it chooses to deny
130. Beginning with Senate Bill 483, introduced by Senator Beverly on March 1, 1979, no
legislative bills introduced to modify the Royal Globe decision have become law. No bills to
otherwise modify "insurance bad faith" law have ever become law.
131. See Holmes, A 4 Model First-Party Insurance-Excess LiabiliY Act, 14 GA. L. Rav. 497
(1980), for an example of a comprehensive legislative proposal dealing with the first party area.
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contract benefits. The additional discretionary monetary awards (pen-
alty and economic damages) that can be awarded to the insured should
encourage insureds to use the expedited procedure and discourage in-
surers from denying valid claims. The relief available would be cumu-
lative to other remedies, but would provide a forum for the expeditious
resolution of the underlying contract question and some ancillary
issues.
The proposal does not base the court's discretionary award on either
strict liability or fault liability. A strict liability standard would en-
courage insurers to pay more claims and be less cost-efficient if all er-
rors in judgment resulted in liability. Such a situation would obviously
raise insurance premiums to even higher levels. A fault liability stan-
dard of "bad faith" would add another issue to the proceeding and
complicate what is designed to be a streamlined hearing. Instead, the
court's discretion in making an award can be tailored to the individual
case and given where merited. Where coverage is determined to exist,
the court's evaluation of whether "bad faith" existed will probably be
implicit in its decision whether to award a penalty and economic
damages.
This proposal will be of the most direct benefit in the first party case.
Regardless of the type of coverage in effect, the central question is
whether coverage exists. Once this determination has been made, the
proceedings will terminate if the decision is in favor of the insurer. If
the insurer loses, there may be another action in which the question of
the insurer's bad faith is litigated. The benefits of the expedited proce-
dure should be obvious: all parties have the chance to obtain expedited
review. An early decision, even though adverse to the insurer, will al-
low it to do whatever is appropriate under the circumstances to mini-
mize its losses. If the decision is adverse to the insured, the insured will
know at an earlier date whether to make adjustments to deal with the
absence of coverage. For example, if the question pertains to coverage
for medical care, the insured may forego certain elective procedures
and not incur services which are not a benefit under the contract.
The legislative proposal will probably be somewhat less effective in
reforming the third party situation. Coverage questions do arise occa-
sionally, and the prompt resolution of the question of whether the car-
rier is obligated to defend and indemnify the insured will be mutually
beneficial.1 3z This legislative proposal will, however, probably not be
of much help in the excess liability case. There the insurer's exposure is
132. See generally Samson v. Transamerica ns. Co., 30 Cal. 3d 220, 178 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1981),
as an example of a situation where declaratory relief in a third party situation might have been
helpful to an insurer.
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dependent on the outcome of the underlying liability action. Gener-
ally, there is no way an independent action for declaratory relief will
provide any benefit to the parties since it is the outcome of the underly-
ing liability case which is foundational to the insurer's potential expo-
sure. Expedited declaratory relief may be of some help in the case
where there is a genuine dispute whether a demand was made by the
insured to settle within the policy limits.
It is impossible to say the proposal which follows will not be mis-
used. Plaintiffs' lawyers may test the waters to determine if they have a
valid bad faith action by filing a barrage of declaratory relief actions
and then proceeding with a bad faith case in those cases where a
favorable decision is obtained. Insurers can, however, minimize losses
inherent in a situation which allows for as much as a five year wait for
trial by obtaining a declaratory relief ruling. Although the statutory
proposal is intended to encourage insurers to go to court and seek a
declaratory judgment, the decision in the Johansen case may discour-
age insurers from taking this approach.
To meet these various needs, it is suggested that the proposed provi-
sion be enacted as Code of Civil Procedure Section 1062.6, to read:
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 1062.6
(Action Respecting Rights, Duties and Obligations of Insurers,
Hospital Service Plans and Health Care Service Plans)
(a) Any reciprocal exchange, interinsurer, Lloyd's insurer, frater-
nal benefit society, fraternal fire insurer, motor clubs, or any person
engaged in the business of insurance (hereinafter "insurer"), or any
hospital service plan, any health care service plan, or any insured,
enrollee, subscriber, beneficiary or any other potentially aggrieved
person, may bring an- action for a declaration of its, his, or her rights,
duties and obligations under the terms of the policies or contracts
under which coverage is alleged to exist.
(b) An action brought pursuant to this section shall be set for
trial at the earliest possible date and shall take precedence over all
other cases, except older matters of the same character and matters to
which special precedence may be given by law.
(c) The court may make a binding declaration of the rights, du-
ties and obligations of the parties under the terms of the policies or
contracts under which coverage is alleged to exist. The declaration
may be affirmative or negative in form and effect and shall have the
force and effect of a final judgment.
(d) The court also may in its discretion award reasonable attor-
neys' fees and other reasonable and necessary costs of litigation to
the prevailing party; and, if judgment is entered against the insurer,
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hospital service plan or health care service plan, the court in its dis-
cretion may also award:
(1) a penalty calculated not to exceed the greater of $500.00 or
10% of the benefits at issue; and,
(2) the amount of actual economic damages sustained as a di-
rect result of the insurer, hospital service plan, or health
care service plan's failure to furnish benefits.
(e) The remedy established by this section is cumulative, and
shall not be construed as restricting any remedy established for the
benefit of any party to the action by any other provision of law. No
declaration under this section shall preclude any party from ob-
taining additional relief based upon the same facts. Any award ob-
tained pursuant to this section shall be credited against any award
obtained in another action based upon the same facts.
(f) The existence of another action between the parties to a suit
brought pursuant to this section shall not preclude the court from
proceeding with the action brought pursuant to this section unless the
other action is also brought exclusively pursuant to the terms of this
section.
CONCLUSION
In addition to the procedural changes suggested by this statute, a
fundamental reexamination of the law of bad faith needs to be under-
taken in California. The recent trend in large awards can only result in
an increase in the cost of coverage for all Californians. The cost of
coverage is one shared not only by all insureds, but by all individuals
who purchase goods and services from an insured. The basic notion of
insurance, sharing the risk of loss, ultimately means that the public
pays the costs through increased rates or, ultimately, a diminution in
coverage. The legislative proposal is a modest step in the process of
stabilizing the law in this area, to avoid excesses that occur when either
insurers or insureds are favored under the law.

